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ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE: A MANTRA IN
NEED OF MEANING
SANFORD LEVINSON*
Our purpose in this Symposium is to ponder the consequences of
Baker v. Carr,' in which the Supreme Court first held that legislative
districting presented a justiciable controversy under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Certainly the
most dramatic consequence was the fundamental transformation
affected in the systems of national and state governance when the
Court, in the 1964 cases Wesberry v. Sanders3 and Reynolds v. Sims,4
declared unconstitutional any system of legislative representation that
did not accord with the fundamental maxim of one person, one vote.
Indeed, the one-person, one-vote maxim-perhaps "mantra" is the
better term-has become the most pervasive legacy of Baker.5
Perhaps like most mantras-one thinks, for example, of "a limited
government of assigned powers"-it may be more easily invoked as
ritual incantation than subjected to rigorous analysis. To be sure,
literally hundreds of cases analyze the term with regard to achieving a
goal of equal population among legislative districts, but, as I shall
demonstrate below, even that particular goal is only fitfully related to
any coherent notion of one person, one vote. John Ely has described
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School. I appreciate the remarkably rapid response of Jack
Balkin to an earlier draft, as well as very helpful suggestions by Sam Issacharoff.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. One might well believe that the decision would
have been better justified in terms of the Republican Form of Government Clause. See,
e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 103, 105-07 (2000); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebuttable
Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1165, 1200-01 (2002). It is not clear, though, if
that really would have made a practical difference with regard to future cases and, in any
case, is irrelevant to the main topic of this Essay.
3. 376 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) ("As nearly as is practicable[,] one man's vote in a
congressional election [must] be worth as much as another's.").
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
5. The term first appeared, however, in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), which
struck down Georgia's "county-unit" system of electing its governors. See Richard Hasen,
The Benefits of "Judicially Unmanageable" Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469,1478 (2002).
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the equipopulation rule as "certainly administrable. In fact,
administrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome question
what else it has to recommend it."6 To the extent that I disagree with
Ely, it is only with regard to his first premise, rather than his
conclusion, for I have come to believe he is surely correct adopting a
skeptical tone about the substantive rule itself. One point of this
Essay, though, is to question whether the mantra even offers the
advantage of easy administration, given the crazy-quilt aspects of the
overall law of suffrage that will be examined.
My goal in this Essay is to express some of my own uncertainties
about what the term one person, one vote actually does, or, just as
much to the point, should, mean. These confusions result from the
fact that the mantra most certainly does not hold true either as a
description of the electorate or even as a normative guide to deciding
which persons should be awarded the franchise and what weight their
votes should actually have in the electoral process. After briefly
discussing these issues, I will address the main topic of the Essay,
which is the potential paradox presented by the fact that the mantra
of one person, one vote seems not at all to commit us, at least in the
view of the Supreme Court, to the proposition that there should be an
equal number of voters in each district. This suggests, perhaps, that
our system is better described as operating under a rule of (something
like) "equal constituents per voting representative," a rule that
generates palpable tension with at least one version of the one-
person, one-vote standard. I will conclude this Essay by analyzing
whether the requirement of an "equal constituency per voting
representative" is an attractive theory of political organization, which,
if so, perhaps could also commend it as a sound approach to
constitutional interpretation.
It is quite remarkable how incoherent certain aspects of this
Supreme Court doctrine remain almost four decades after the
confident assertions in both Baker and Reynolds about the
application of the Equal Protection Clause to the complex issue of
drawing electoral districts. I emphasize that I am not simply making
the point that, as with any body of legal doctrine, there will always be
difficult cases at the margin. Rather, the central concepts ostensibly
at the core of the doctrine may make little sense when subjected to
close examination.
Consider the most obvious example of the mantra's failure as an
empirical description: one person, one vote does not-indeed cannot,
6. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980).
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as a matter of common sense-mean that every single person within a
polity gets a (single) vote. We know this because there are literally
millions of persons within the polity who do not get even a single
vote. The easiest example is children; not even professors or students
who take pleasure in offering provocative arguments suggest that,
say, five- or twelve-year olds-or, for all but the very most
provocative, sixteen-year olds-should have the right to vote.
Whatever "imperfections" may pervade the Constitution,7 no one has
given that label to its presumptive permission to states to limit the
suffrage to those older than eighteen years of age.8
As a practical matter, almost certainly the most important-and
controversial-current deviation from "universal suffrage" involves
felons and ex-felons. As Alex Keyssar writes, the approximately four
million felons and ex-felons "constitute the largest single group of
American citizens who are barred by law from participating in
elections." 9 And, as we discovered during the Florida fiasco last year,
significant political consequences can flow from the exclusion of
felons even following their release from prison.1" To be sure, the
Supreme Court in 197411 almost perfunctorily upheld the right of
states to deny convicted felons the right to vote on the basis of a
singularly wooden textual analysis of Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 2 Even if one accepts the Court's ruling as definitive
7. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (offering, in first half of book, a
series of short essays by various scholars regarding "stupid" constitutional provisions).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. As someone who once worked for the Children's
Defense Fund, I would be quite willing to spend considerably more time discussing the
exclusion of minors, since the various reasons that are offered, including lack of relevant
knowledge or lack of a capacity for good judgment, could certainly apply to many persons
over eighteen. Still, as already suggested, it would be impossible to defend age-blind
allocation of the suffrage even if one wanted to tweak somewhat the present system of
universal denial of suffrage to persons classified as minors.
9. ALEX KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 308 (2000). Interestingly enough, Keyssar
ignores the fact that the number of child-citizens is obviously far greater, which simply
reinforces the point that we literally do not even think about the fact that they are
excluded from the suffrage.
10. The consequences are the result also of a certain clumsiness, shall we say, in the
method by which Florida (and, presumably, other states) identify the ostensibly affected
citizens. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1046-48 (2001) (suggesting that Al Gore would have
been recognized as the winner of the Florida vote had many of his likely supporters not
been disenfranchised by the indefensibly slipshod Florida process of determining who
were felons).
11. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
12. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
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with regard to constitutional command, this obviously has nothing to
do with the equities of the issue. This could, after all, like the death
penalty-and unlike depriving children of the right to vote-be
simply one more substantive injustice that is in fact tolerated by a
highly imperfect Constitution.
One might also discuss in this context the millions of resident
aliens who, whatever their status as residents and taxpayers within the
United States, have no right to participate in basic political activities
like voting or jury service. 13 Given that such aliens do indeed enjoy
the constitutional protection for at least some civil rights,'14 we see the
survival, even into the twenty-first century, of the strong distinction
between "civil" and "political" rights. This distinction was relied on
by at least some defenders of the Fourteenth Amendment to reassure
their political adversaries that this new addition to the Constitution
would not in fact require that the millions of new black citizens would
be entitled to vote or even to serve on a jury. Both voting and jury
service were quintessential examples of "political rights," in contrast
with such paradigm "civil rights" as the right to sue or testify in court
or to enter into contracts for the purchase or sale of land.15
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole numbers of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote ... is denied to any of
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
13. The Supreme Court, for example, "has never held that aliens have a constitutional
right to vote or to hold high public office .... Indeed, implicit in many of [the] Court's
voting rights decisions is the notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting
such rights." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1973). I have discussed
elsewhere the theoretical issues presented by denial of the franchise to at least long-term
resident aliens. Sanford Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote? 41 FLA.
L. REV. 545, 555 (1989); see also Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The
Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1391, 1416-70 (1993) (defending alien suffrage); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal
Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1092-93, 1104-36 (1977)
(defending alien suffrage).
14. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 689-96 (2001) (holding that illegal
aliens are protected by the Due Process Clause against being held in indefinite detention);
Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 636 (striking down a New York civil service law providing that only
U.S. citizens may hold permanent positions in state civil service).
15. See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 264-65 (4th ed. 2000); Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in
Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton
Houston, 74 J. AM. IST. 884,887 (1987).
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The conventional wisdom, enshrined into current legal
understanding, is that only enrolled members of a given political
community should possess the right to vote. Of course the begged
question is what in the world constitutes that community. Does
enjoyment of the formal juridical status of "citizen" truly establish
one as a member of a political community? Interestingly enough, we
increasingly observe the practice in the European Union of allowing
nationals of one E.U. country, who reside in a second E.U. country,
to vote in at least some of the elections of the latter. 6 Within the
United States, Takoma Park, Maryland, amended its municipal
charter in 1992 to allow resident aliens to vote in local elections,
joining several smaller localities in Maryland in allowing non-citizen
voting.'8 Indeed, even in New York City, resident aliens with children
in the school system are apparently allowed to vote in elections for
local school boards.' 9
Needless to say, the United States has not achieved such
cosmopolitanism even with regard to membership in the various
states that constitute the American political union. As a technical
matter, one apparently can enjoy "domicile" or legal "residence" in
only one state.20 I strongly suspect that it would constitute a criminal
offense to attempt to vote in more than one state. North Carolina,
for example, makes a condition of registration to vote in that state the
certification that one will not be voting in another state 1
16. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 13, at 1458-60. "Every citizen of the Union residing
in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as
a candidate at municipal elections in the Members State in which he resides, under the
same conditions as nationals of that State." IE at 1459 (citing Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, in COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION 15 (1992)).
17. Id at 1463-66.
18. Id. at 1462.
19. Richard Briffault of the Columbia Law School, an expert on New York local
government, has written to me as follows: "Noncitizen parents can vote in community
school board elections. These are elections that select the community boards that have
some significant role in operating elementary and junior high schools (but not high
schools)." E-mail from Richard Briffault to Sanford Levinson (Feb. 14,2002) (on file with
author).
20. See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3612 (2d ed. 1984) ("A person has only one domicile at a particular time,
even though he may have several residences."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS § 11(2), cmt. m (1971). I am grateful to my colleague Linda Mullenix and to
Professor Jack Goldsmith for providing me with these references.
21. See State Board of Elections, Registering To Vote in North Carolina, at
http//www.sboe.state.nc.us/voterweblqualvote.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Interestingly enough, North Carolina seems not to
require an affirmative "renunciation" of citizenship in another state. It would be
2002] 1273
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Far more difficulty emerges if we link suffrage not to possibly
mysterious notions of political identity but, rather, to the practical
reality that voting is a crucial way by which groups can protect their
own interests in a liberal democracy. To exclude persons from the
right to vote is often the equivalent, as a practical matter, of excluding
them from (genuine) representation, a topic about which I shall have
more to say presently. Suffice it to say at this point, though, that the
presumed constitutional entitlement to deny the right to vote to
resident aliens (or out-of-staters who, for whatever reason, wish to
retain their prior communal identity) scarcely eliminates any concerns
about the political justice of such deprivations.
At the very least, then, we see that invocation of the mantra of
one person, one vote is both inaccurate as a descriptive matter and,
just as importantly, provides no guidance at all to deciding which
persons in the first place will be admitted to the franchise. That
decision requires a substantive theory of political membership that
rests on far more than "merely" being a "person" who would, indeed,
very much like to vote.
The Court's primary consideration of this issue can be found in
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,1 which was also the last
of Chief Justice Warren's opinions for the Court relating to
apportionment. New York law limited the right to vote in school-
district elections to those otherwise eligible citizens who also had
children in the public school system or owned or leased property that
was subject to taxation. The Court noted that among the persons
disqualified from voting in school-district elections were:
[S]enior citizens and others living with children or relatives;
clergy, military personnel, and others who live on tax-
exempt property; boarders and lodgers; parents who neither
own nor lease qualifying property and whose children are
too young to attend school; parents who neither own nor
interesting to find out, though, if North Carolina would, for example, recognize an out-of-
state domicile by a person registered to vote in the state. But see Wit v. Berman, 00-9482
(2d Cir. 2002), in which a person with two homes in New York is claiming a right to vote in
municipal elections in both places. Columbia law professor Richard Briffault, who argued
the case before the Second Circuit for the plaintiff, reports "that the district court, without
opinion, granted the state's motion to dismiss. That order is now on appeal before the
Second Circuit." E-mail from Richard Briffault to Sanford Levinson (Feb. 15, 2002) (on
file with author).
22. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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lease qualifying property and whose children attend private
schools.
The Court subjected the exclusion to "strict scrutiny," because
"some resident citizens are permitted to participate and some are
not."24 Conforming to Gerald Gunther's famous maxim about the
consequences of "strict scrutiny,"'  the strict scrutiny was indeed
"fatal" to New York's legislation, as the Court held that the State's
requirements "are not sufficiently tailored to limiting the franchise to
those 'primarily interested' in school affairs to justify the denial of the
franchise.
26
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Black and Harlan, dissented.27
They pointed out that the discriminatory law was passed by a New
York legislature for whose members all of the excluded voters could
in fact vote? There was, therefore, no "lockup" of the kind that
prevented any practical reform of the malapportionment that
triggered Baker v. Carr.29 For the dissenters, the mantra of one
person, one vote seemed to triumph over a more nuanced approach
to structuring necessarily complex political institutions. That Mr.
Kramer was a member of New York's overall political community did
not entail that he was a member of the particular community best
suited to engage in school-district elections. 0
Let us assume, though, that we have successfully resolved the
question of deciding who is a member of the relevant political
community. We might then infer from our mantra that each voter,
23. Id at 630. The specific litigant, Mr. Kramer, is described by the Court as "a 31-
year-old college-educated stockbroker who lives in his parents' home." Id.
24. Id. at 629.
25. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
26. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 633.
27. Id. at 634-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. Id at 639-40 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
29. See Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism: Baker v. Carr and
Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1424 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and
Political Cartels, _ HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 643 (1998). Though Issacharoff and Pildes do not specifically discuss the situation in
Baker v. Carr, it is an obvious example of the kind of "lockup" they criticize, inasmuch as
the rural representatives who benefited from the status quo obviously had no incentive to
support reapportionment and, more importantly, had the political power, under the status
quo, to quash any legislative efforts to reapportion.
30. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 637-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Fumarolo v.
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1300 (Ill. 1990) (striking down Chicago's deviation
from one person, one vote in allocating suffrage for school board elections), reprinted in
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCrURES OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 204 (2d ed. 2001).
2002] 1275
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when admitted to the voting booth, is allowed to cast only one vote
or, at most, the identical number of votes that everyone else in the
electorate is allowed to cast. This is no small matter. After all, in
nineteenth and early twentieth century England, for example,
graduates of Oxford and Cambridge were given an extra vote,
acknowledging their special status in society. Rejection of any such
differentiation is an important expression of a commitment to the
formal equality of all voters and the rejection of just such class
distinctions as justified the special status of Oxbridge graduates.
Before one says too confidently that this practice is ruled out in
the United States, however, one must acknowledge those cases,
admittedly relatively few, in which the Supreme Court has allowed
votes to be allocated on the basis of property. The Court has asserted
that these are not genuine "legislative districts," but, rather,
administrative units with regard to highly specific governmental
programs.' So even with regard to formal equality of voters, one
must recognize that the principle applies only to some aspects of the
polity and not to others.
More importantly, though, formal inequality in the suffrage is
not necessarily indefensible. My home state of Texas, for example,
elects almost all state officials, including judges (at all levels) and the
agricultural commissioner, among many others. Would it really be
indefensible to grant all lawyers a second vote with regard to the
election of judges or all farmers a second vote with regard to the
election of the agricultural commissioner, on the ground that they are
likely to possess some relevant knowledge and/or possess relevant
interests that would justify this slight extra weight in the electoral
scales? Would this really constitute the same kind of deviation from
democratic values that we might believe was true of the English
practice of plural voting based on attending Oxford or Cambridge?
One difference, after all, is that Oxbridge graduates got an extra vote
31. See generally Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (examining the process for
electing directors of a water reclamation district in Arizona); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (electing boards of directors to a
state-created water storage district). The politics of water in the arid Southwest are
scarcely unimportant. Indeed, as Joel Garreau has written, "In the dry Southwest, water is
the linchpin of the universe." JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW
FRONTIER 193 (1991). It is, to put it mildly, not clear why state governments are entitled
to treat water as more "special" than public education when deciding how to allocate
voting power. See generally Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One
Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CI. L. REV. 339 (1993) (examining the scope of
federal constitutional protections of the right to vote at the local level and suggesting the
need for a fourth model of local government, federative local governments, to supplement
the three existing models of local government).
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for any and all offices, whereas the proposed plural vote is far more
specific. Lawyers would not gain an advantage in choosing the
agricultural commissioner, nor would farmers have an extra vote in
deciding who should serve on the judiciary.
One alternative to electing judges or agricultural commissioners,
of course, is simply to appoint them. Common sense suggests that
lawyers or agricultural interests would play a significant, if not,
indeed, dominant role in the selection process. If we are not
perturbed by that, then what, exactly, would be wrong with giving
them a slight advantage if the officers are selected by the electorate
instead of by the governor? Weighted voting in this instance might
strike one as a good compromise between a populist principle of "let
the people decide" and a more functionalist principle of "let those
most knowledgeable about or directly interested in the subject
decide." It would take this Essay too far afield to offer a full analysis
of these examples; it should be obvious, though, that mindless
repetition of one person, one vote is of almost no help at all to
anyone seeking genuine illumination regarding the meaning of equal
suffrage.
Much analysis of the notion of equal suffrage has revolved
around the notion of voting power and, concomitantly, discussions of
how one measures effective voting power. Among other explanations
for this discussion is the Supreme Court's own insistence that "fair
and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic
aim of legislative apportionment. ' 32  Any concern for "fair and
effective representation" requires, among other things, that we
recognize the all-important truth that practical politics is not a story
of isolated individuals casting votes independently from one another
but, rather, the mobilization of groups, including, of course, political
parties. Although much scorn, some of it justified, has been heaped
on the notion of "identity politics," no one can cogently discuss
political representation without recognizing the central reality of
political identity, whether it be described by reference to the standard
political parties (Democratic or Republican), ideological
configurations (liberal or conservative), economic interests (business
or labor), or other demographic attributes (white and non-white).
The justifiable concern about gerrymanders, whether racial or
political (assuming that these can be distinguished) would make
absolutely no sense if we did not in fact agree on the practical
32. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,565-66 (1964).
12772002]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
stupidity of treating persons as if their identity is independent of their
membership in ascertainable groups.33
Having told you at some length what are not my topics, I now
turn to what I am going to discuss. I begin with the following
assumption, seen most clearly in current doctrine regarding
congressional districting: District A should have, as much as is
practically possible, the "same population" as District B, 4 at least in
the first election following the relevant apportionment. This last
clause is no small point. One of the odder features of the one-person,
one-vote doctrine, when applied to the population of electoral
districts, is that it seemingly applies only in the first election cycle out
of the (usual) five in any ten-year period. That is, the practical
dynamics of population growth and mobility in the United States
operate to assure that mathematically identical districts (by whatever
measure) in the first election are almost certainly going to be
different, often dramatically so, by the third or fourth election.
Indeed, as a practical matter, this differentiation might be present
even by the actual occurrence of the first election, which takes place
two years after the enumeration on which the reapportionment will
have been based.
Consider, for example, the implications of some of the
demographics of American population growth between 1990 and
2000. Texas grew from almost seventeen million to almost twenty-
one million persons, a change of 22.8%. Only California had a larger
population gain, though California's growth rate was only 13.8%.
New York, the third largest state, grew by less than a million, for a
5.5% growth rate. The highest percentage of growth was Nevada,
which grew by 66.3% in the decade, followed by Arizona with a 40%
33. I should note for the record that I continue to be extremely impressed by
Jonathan Still's 1981 article arguing that proportional representation is the only system
that genuinely satisfies the maxim of one person, one vote once one moves beyond a
completely naive and untenable focus on atomized individuals as the unit of analysis.
Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems 91 ETHICS 375, 384-85 (1981).
This analysis helps to explain, as I have argued elsewhere, why the topic of proportional
representation continues to be a "brooding omnipresence" in ongoing discussions about
what constitutes fairness in voting systems. See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and
the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33
UCLA L. REV. 257, passim (1985). It has become ever more clear over the years, though,
that serious discussion of the issues raised by notions of "fairness" in group representation
depends, among other things, on certain technical skills that I do not possess. This is only
one of the reasons I am not exploring the questions raised by traditional gerrymandering.
34. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,731-40 (1983).
[Vol. 801278
2002] DEFINING ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE 1279
growth rate .3  As one would expect, the patterns of growth within a
given state were sometimes little "smoother" than were national
patterns. Thus, within Texas, Travis County (the location of Austin
and, indeed, the University of Texas Law School), grew by 40%, and
Austin replaced El Paso as Texas's fourth largest city, as the latter
city grew by less than 10%.36
Alternatively, consider the changes in population of Texas's
thirty congressional districts,37 all of which had approximately 565,000
persons in the reapportionment conducted on the basis of 1990 census
figures. Two of the districts (Districts 3 and 26, which are relatively
close to Dallas), now have more than 800,000 people. By 2000,
Congressional District 10 (which includes Austin) had a population of
approximately 791,000, while District 18 (one of Houston's districts)
was now the smallest in the state with a population of approximately
60 6,000MS If one makes the reasonable assumption that population
growth in these areas throughout the decade was relatively linear,
then it is clear the so-called equal populations created in the 1991
session of the Texas legislature and based on 1990 population figures
were misleading from the moment of creation. As a result, they bore
ever less resemblance to the reality of Texas population growth as the
decade went by.39
35. U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 PHC-T-2 Ranking Tables for States: 1990 and
2000, Table 2: States Ranked by Numeric Population Change: 1990 to 2000, http://
www.census.gov/populationlcen2OOO/phc-t2/tabo2.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
36. U.S. Census Bureau, Population for the 15 Largest Counties and Incorporated
Places in Texas: 1990 and 2000, http://vww.census.gov/Press-Release/Www/2001/tables/
txtab_6.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Bexar County (San Antonio) and Dallas County both grew by less than 20%, as against
Collin County's quite remarkable growth rate of 86.2% (and impressive growth in
absolute numbers as well of more than 225,000 people). Amarillo, which was Texas's
eleventh largest city in 1990 (with almost 160,000 people), dropped to fourteenth, with a
mere 10% population growth to almost 175,000 persons. Plano, on the other hand,
jumped from thirteenth in 1990 to ninth in 2000, with the addition of almost 100,000 new
people (a 27.2% growth rate).
37. Because of population growth, Texas will have thirty-two representatives in the
next Congress.
38. See U.S. Census Bureau, Georgraphic Area: Texas-Congressional District
(106th Congress), http://lvww.census.gov/c2sslwwwlProductslProfiles/2000/index.htm (last
visited April 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
39. Similar patterns can be detected in looking at population tables from other states.
Thus, for example, North Carolina's twelve districts (as of 1990-it will have thirteen
districts in future Congresses) now range in population from 588,000 (the First District) to
766,000 (the Fourth District). Michigan gained far less population, only rising 6.9%, than
did Texas (22.8%) or North Carolina (right behind Texas at 21.4%); indeed, it will lose a
seat in the next Congress. Even the Michigan districts, though, now range from 575,000
(District 12) to 686,000 (District 2). See U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Area: North
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So, as a practical matter, the right of an individual to be in a
congressional district with close to the identical population of every
other district in the state exists, at most, for only one election. For
the other four elections in the typical cycle, it is presumably
permissible if the given voter in District 1 resides in a larger district
than some other voter in District 2. Why this should be so, if we
really believe that a truly important individual right is at stake, is not
easily explained. Although it is true that the Constitution mandates a
census only every decade, it would be altogether feasible if courts (or
an unusually zealous Congress determined to "enforce" Reynolds'
mandate through exercise of its section 5 powers) required states to
conduct their own population counts every two years (and to redraw
district lines accordingly). If the reader's intuition is that this
requirement would be at best inane, and perhaps out-and-out insane,
then perhaps this reaction should suggest a re-evaluation of the
wisdom of the mantra in the first place.40
Carolina-Congressional District (106th Congress); Geographic Area: Michigan-
Congressional District (106th Congress), http://www.census.gov.c2ss/wwwlProducts/
Profles/2000/index.htm (last visited April 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
40. Or, of course, this limited protection of the ostensible "right" to an equal vote
may be added evidence for the proposition that no one can take seriously the argument
that Baker and Reynolds are designed to protect an "individual right" in the first place.
According to Sam Issacharoff:
[T]his reading is implausible. Rather, the history of the rule shows it to be
primarily directed at official self-dealing. It was the absence of redistricting that
promoted the representational distortions that the Court finally came to address
in Baker and Reynolds. The Reynolds rule is, in my view, best seen as a
prophylactic construct that limits the range of what redistricting powers may do.
By requiring that the deck be reshuffled once every ten years, it serves to make
more difficult one type of gerrymandering. But it has little to say as a rule of
absolute individual entitlement to equal representation ....
Posting of Samuel Issacharoff to Discussion List for Con Law Professors (Jan. 3, 2002)
(copy on file with author). There is much to be said for Issacharoff's "prophylactic"
reading of these cases, though, of course, the doctrine has scarcely operated to prevent
some remarkably patent "self-dealing" in partisan gerrymanders. See, e.g., Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113-34 (1986). Indeed, Issacharoff emphasizes that the current
doctrine appears to go out of its way to legitimize duopolistic self-dealing by the two
predominant parties if they carve out districts to preserve their respective incumbents by
leaving them safe from serious (inter-party) challenge. See Issacharoff, supra note 29;
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,738,751-54 (1973).
The Court, of course, has been strikingly less deferential with regard to so-called
"racial gerrymanders," as seen in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny.
Professor Saunders has suggested that these cases are best understood as the application
of basically "prophylactic" (and, by definition, overbroad) rules adopted by the Court to
safeguard against what may be hard-to-detect specific instances of unconstitutional
discrimination. See Melissa Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-
Conscious Districting, 109 YALE L.J. 1603,1606,1636-37 (2000).
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As we move away from congressional districts, greater deviation
from "pure" population equality is tolerated, but even there the
Court continues to require a requisite degree of equality, even if it
adopts a more latitudinarian standard than that applied to
congressional districts.41  The Court "explained," according to
Geoffrey Stone and his colleagues,
that "more flexibility was constitutionally permissible with
respect to state legislative reapportionment" because of the
interest in "the normal functioning of state and local
governments." It held that the deviations in the Virginia
plan satisfied Reynolds' goal of "substantial equality of
population" and were justified by "the State's policy of
maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines.
42
It is obvious, then, that the mantra presents a host of difficulties
in practical implementation. That being said, we live within a
positive-law universe that insists that we take it seriously. I now turn,
at last, to my primary focus in the rest of this Essay, which is how,
under the mantra of one person, one vote, we decide what constitutes
the "equal population" of two (or more) districts. And this discussion
will, in turn, generate some musings on the term "representative
government."
My basic argument is as follows: Our political system, as
reflected in relevant judicial decisions, is not at all committed to the
notion of one person, one vote if that term means that political
District A should in fact contain the same number of voters as
political District B. Instead, the United States currently seems to
operate under a system in which any given representative should have
(roughly) the same number of constituents as any other
representative.43 One might refer to this as the "one voting
representative/one constituent" model. An obvious question is
whether this model makes sense, either as a constitutional
41. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328-29 (1973) (upholding a Virginia
legislative districting plan in which one district had 16.4% greater population than
another).
42. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755 (4th ed. 2001). It is
obvious that no definite meaning can be assigned the "substantial degree of equality" that
is required by the Equal Protection Clause. As with Justice Stewart's notorious example
of hard-core pornography, the Court "know[s] it when [it] see[s] it." See Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Moreover, it is obvious, as with
congressional districts, that whatever "substantial equality of population" is required (for
whatever reason), it matters not, apparently, if it is absent in elections following the first
one in the ten-year cycle.
43. This is subject to the caveat that the standard operates only for the first election
following reapportionment.
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requirement or, perhaps more importantly, as a sound theory of
political organization.
There is, to put it mildly, a paucity of judicial discussion of the
point. One Supreme Court case, Burns v. Richardson,4I examines the
problem, but it is, astonishingly, almost as old as Baker v. Carp5 itself.
Thus in 1966, just after the revolution announced by Reynolds, the
Supreme Court addressed a Hawaii redistricting plan in which
"equality" of population was computed by reference to the number of
registered voters in each district.46 The practical reality was this: If
population alone were the measure, then the island of Oahu would be
entitled to 79% of the seats in the Hawaii legislature, which would
mean forty of the fifty-one members of the House of Representatives.
If legislative seats were allocated on the basis only of registered
voters, on the other hand, Oahu's share of the population would drop
to 73% and its number of representatives to thirty-seven. Much of
the difference in the two population bases was attributable to the
significant number of military personnel (from other states) stationed
on Oahu. So one might phrase the question in the following
(deceptively) simple way: Was Oahu entitled to elect
"representatives" of persons who were in fact not members of the
Hawaiian political community?
Speaking for the Supreme Court,47 Justice Brennan "start[ed]
with the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause does not
require the States to use total population figures derived from the
federal census as the standard by which ... population equivalency is
to be measured. '4 He noted that the opinion in Reynolds "carefully
left open the question what population was being referred to,"49 and
he pointed out that a companion case to Reynolds ° had "treated an
apportionment based upon United States citizen population as
presenting problems no different from apportionments using a total
population measure."51 Thus, according to Brennan, the Court had
44. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
45. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
46. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 80-82. Just as Burns is the sole case discussing the issue,
there also seems to be an astonishing paucity of law review commentary. The leading
article is Scot A. Reader, One Person, One Vote Revisited: Choosing a Population Basis
To Form Political Districts, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521 (1994).
47. Justice Fortas did not participate and Justices Harlan and Stewart only concurred
in the judgment. 384 U.S. 73, 98-99 (1966) (Harlan, J. and Stewart, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 91.
49. Id.
50. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
51. Burns, 384 U.S. at 91-92.
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never "suggested that the States are required to include aliens,
transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the
vote for conviction of crime, in the apportionment base by which their
legislators are distributed and against which compliance with the
Equal Protection Clause is to be measured.
52
It is probably not surprising that Justice Brennan paid no
attention to the oft-ignored Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which states that "Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed."' 3 The specific exclusion of "Indians not taxed" supports the
view that all other "persons," regardless of their citizenship status,
should be counted at least with regard to determining each state's
representation in Congress. 4 Ask yourself, for example, if Congress
today, in deciding the apportionment of representation for the States,
could "enforce" Section 2 by excluding from the relevant count
"aliens" or felons. This new rule would have profound political
consequences for such states as New York, Florida, Texas, and
California, all of them havens for recent immigrants, not to mention
for presumptive "winners" like Montana, Vermont, and the Dakotas,
which, one suspects, have relatively low percentages of non-citizens in
their overall population.5 It may be, of course, that Section 2,
properly interpreted, places constraints on Congress that the Equal
Protection Clause does not place on the states themselves, even when
constructing congressional districts. Even if this constitutional
analysis is correct, though, it obviously does not begin to address the
general theoretical justification for any such difference.
52. Id. at 92.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
54. The Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as not giving birthright
citizenship to American Indians born on reservations, see Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109
(1884), though one presumes that Mr. Elk, having left the reservation and settled in
Omaha, was subject to Nebraska taxes. Assuming, then, that he was still living in Omaha
in 1890, he presumably would have been counted as part of the population base for
Nebraska's representation in the House. As will be noted below, see infra notes 83-98 and
accompanying text, it is not clear what it means to say that Mr. Elk was "represented"
absent his (and other American Indians') right to vote.
55. I offer "suspicion" rather than hard evidence because, astonishingly enough, the
United States Census apparently does not tabulate population by reference to citizenship
or non-citizenship (or, indeed, the legality of one's residence within the United States).
There may be good political explanations for this remarkable omission, but it is hard to
believe that inquiring minds would not be interested in the demographics of residents'
juridical status.
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One might note that Justice Brennan's list of persons to whose
political fate the Constitution is apparently indifferent does not
include those citizens who are not registered to vote. It is, then,
perhaps not surprising that he goes on to state that "[u]se of a
registered voter or actual voter basis presents" a problem, which is
that it seems to make political representation a function of "political
activity of those eligible to register and vote." 6 There are many
potential explanations for the failure to register, but it is obviously
not unthinkable, given American political practices, 7 that registration
rates are a function of what Brennan terms "improper influences"5
by local political elites determined to exercise control over the voting
population. Thus the Court concludes that Hawaii's reliance on such
data is acceptable "only because on this record it was found to have
produced a distribution of legislators not substantially different from
that which would have resulted from the use of a pennissible
population basis." 9 Part of the reason for this conclusion is that
Hawaii appears to have had a high percentage of registered voters,60
though another reason, frankly, is that the plan before the Court was
only an "interim" one.6  The Court presumably thought it
undesirable to disable the state from conducting its 1966 elections
under the plan that had been adopted, whatever its imperfections.
Thus the opinion issued a strong cautionary note: "We are not to be
understood as deciding that the validity of the registered voters basis
as a measure has been established for all time or circumstances, in
Hawaii or elsewhere." 62
The issue of population base remained basically quiescent for a
full quarter-century, until Garza v. County of Los Angeles.63 The
issue raised in Garza was the propriety of drawing districts that, by
excluding resident aliens among others ineligible to vote, led to a
claimed under-representation of Hispanics in the Los Angeles City
Council. The majority of the Ninth Circuit panel almost blithely
56. Burns, 384 U.S. at 92.
57. See generally DENNIS THOMPSON, JUST ELECIONS (forthcoming 2002),
(demonstrating that American practices regarding voting registration are considerably
more stringent than anywhere else in the world); see also KEYSSAR, supra note 9, at 311-
15 (discussing the tendency of less burdensome registration procedures to result in a
higher voter turnout).
58. Burns, 384 U.S. at 92.
59. Id at 93 (emphasis added).
60. See id. at 96 n.26 (noting that even if an error in statistics was corrected, the
registration rate exceeded eighty percent).
61. See, e.g., id. at 97.
62. Id. at 96.
63. 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
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relied on a sentence from the Supreme Court's seminal 1964 decision
in Wesberry v. Sanders' concerning congressional districting.65 In that
case, the Court announced that "the fundamental principle of
representative government is one of equal representation for equal
numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or
place of residence within a state."'  After quoting James Madison's
statement that the House of Representatives would be " 'founded on
the aggregate number of inhabitants of each state,'"67 the Ninth
Circuit goes on to assure readers that "[t]he framers were aware that
this apportionment and representation base would include categories
of persons who were ineligible to vote-women, children, bound
servants, convicts, the insane, and, at a later time, aliens."'
Interestingly enough, the court did not include in its originalist litany
perhaps the best example for its point-the Three-Fifths Clause.
After all, one of the most important compromises at Philadelphia was
to increase the power of slave states in the House of Representatives
(and the Electoral College) by allowing them to count each slave as
three-fifths of a person for purposes of computing representation. 9
Nothing could better demonstrate the point that representation of
states in the Congress had literally nothing to do with whether the
persons purportedly represented were part of the political community
in any sense.70  In any event, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
"population is an7I appropriate basis for state legislative
apportionment."72
This opinion drew a separate dissent and concurrence from
Judge Alex Kozinski, who interpreted the relevant case law to require
an equality of voting power and thus to support the exclusion of non-
voters from the computational pool. He distinguished between what
he called "the principle of equal representation" and a quite different
64. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
65. Garza, 918 F.2d at 774.
66. IL
67. 1& (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 369 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961)).
68. Id at774.
69. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 73-74 (1996).
70. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,404-06 (1857) (expressing the
proposition that blacks could not as a constitutional matter, be part of the American
political community). Any state could, if it wished, welcome blacks into its political
community, though, as a matter of fact, almost none did, as Chief Justice Taney
demonstrated all too well.
71. Perhaps one should insert a "sic," for the court seems to suggest that population is
the basis of apportionment. Garza, 918 F.2d at 774-75.
72. ld. at 774.
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"principle of electoral equality."'73 The first principle, basically, is
what I have alluded to earlier as an "equal constituency per voting
representative" rule. It is obvious that this principle has only the
most accidental relation to any plausible account of one person, one
vote, in as much as one district could have considerably more voters
(eligible or actual) than another.74 The second principle, obviously,
builds on our mantra, but it just as certainly leads to the possibility of
significant disparities in the actual numbers of persons "represented"
in any two given districts with significantly different populations of
persons ineligible to vote.
As Kozinski notes, acceptance of "representational equality" as
against "voting equality" has the ironic consequence of entailing at
least a partial return to the phenomenon that triggered the original
litigation in Baker v. Carr.' The complaint in Baker, after all,
concerned the "debased" voting power of members of a voter-rich
district who were entitled to only the same number of ultimate
representatives as the voters in a voter-poor district.76 Kozinski
interpreted the cases to protect "a right belonging to the individual
elector," with "the key question" thereby becoming "whether the
votes of some electors are materially undercounted," relative to some
measure of voting power, "because of the manner in which districts
are apportioned. '77 As Heather Gerken demonstrates in her own
contribution to this Symposium, there is more than enough material
in the case law to support Kozinski's "individualist" reading even if
one believes, as she does (and I agree), that a focus on the rights of
the "individual elector" is fundamentally misconceived.78
The Supreme Court did not believe that the issues presented
merited a grant of certiorari,79 so the Ninth Circuit debate, a full
decade later, remains both the best and most legally authoritative
73. Id. at 781-82 (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting).
74. As Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres put it, the underlying principle seems to be
that no representative be burdened with an extra-large number of constituents to service.
Otherwise, they describe the Ninth Circuit's "numerical test" as having "nothing to do
with voting at all." LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY:
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 190 (2002).
75. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
76. Justice Brennan described the plaintiffs as complaining that they "are denied the
equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of their votes." Baker, 369
U.S. at 194.
77. Garza, 918 F.2d at 782 (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting).
78. This is, of course, the general point of Professor Gerken's article. See Gerken,
supra note 29.
79. 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
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account of the questions raised. That being said, it scarcely presents a
definitive resolution of the problem posed by trying to make sense,
within our sometimes astonishingly complex social system, of the
mantra of one person, one vote. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's solution
requires, as Judge Kozinski demonstrates, that one ignore one
obviously plausible implication of the mantra and adopt instead a rule
that, as a practical matter, assures the unequal power of voters in
different districts with different rates of alien populations. 0
The basic question of determining equal voting power across
political districts arises, of course, with regard to all representative
institutions, ranging from the House of Representatives81 to a county
board of commissioners 2 The "law of large numbers" may limit the
consequences of adopting Kozinski's "representation principle"
instead of his "voting equality" maxim with regard to congressional
districting. Even here, though, it might be illuminating to compare at
least some of the 435 congressional districts by reference to their
populations of resident aliens or incarcerated prisoners, not to
mention children. It would surely not be surprising if, say, a
congressional district in Idaho contains significantly more potential
voters than does a given district in Los Angeles or Brooklyn. As we
move to smaller state- or local-level districts, however, the differences
80. And this may be the result not only of differential alien populations, but also of
age distributions. For example, consider the fact that California's current District 29
contains only 13.9% population under the age of eighteen years, whereas more than a
third (36.2%) of the population of District 37, as of 2000, is under the age of majority.
Census Bureau, Profiles of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, http://
www.census.gov/census_2000/datasetsldemographic.profile/CalifornialzkhO6.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
81. I put the United States Senate to one side, though it is obvious that it cannot
survive the application of any serious one-person, one-vote standard. Indeed, as Jack
Balkin has suggested, this is also true of at least some "inter" rather than "intra-state"
comparisons of congressional districts. That is, even if all California districts have the
identical number of persons (and thus fulfill at least one plausible theory of equality), it is
almost certain that the California districts would vary significantly when compared with
districts from some other states. Or simply consider the smallest state with only one
representative-Wyoming, with a 2000 population of almost 500,000 and the largest such
state, Montana, which in 2000 contained approximately 900,000 people. Rhode Island gets
an additional representative with only 150,000 more persons than Montana. See U.S.
Census Bureau, Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, by State:
Census 2000, http:l/vwv.census.gov/population/cen2000/tabol.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Were these various states simply
counties of a "superstate," then it is obvious that the court would intervene and require
redistricting. What prevents this remarkable result, of course, is federalism and the
sanctity attached to state boundary lines, a subject whose justification is beyond the scope
of this Essay.
82. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476, 482-85 (1968) (applying
Reynolds to a commissioners court of a Texas county).
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produced by adopting one or the other of Judge Kozinski's conflicting
standards would become ever more dramatic. "Bedroom suburbs,"
for example, that cater to families with small children would
presumably have significantly fewer voters per total population than
would a gated community confined to those eligible for membership
in the American Association of Retired Persons. As a political
matter, one might welcome this (relative) diminution in the power of
the "geezer vote," but no one should doubt the significant political
ramifications of deciding, in effect, to privilege the votes of parents
with young children over the votes of their own parents (and
grandparents).
Guinier and Torres point to anomalies in the use of prisoners as
part of the basis for allocating representation. The locale of the
prisons, rather than the locality in which the prisoner resided (and, of
course, within which his or her family may continue to reside), is
treated as the "home district" of the prisoner. As Guinier and Torres
write: "The strategic placement of prisons in predominantly white
rural districts often means that these districts gain more political
representation based on the disenfranchised people in prison, while
the inner-city communities these prisoners come from suffer a
proportionate loss of political power and representation."' Consider
in this context Hartley County, Texas. Its 2000 population was 5,537,
representing a 100% growth since 1990. Lest one thinks that yuppies
are discovering its charms (which might explain similar population
patterns in Vermont, for example), the explanation is that the county,
located in the desolate far northwest corner of Texas, near New
Mexico, is the site of a new prison built during the 1990s, which
contains approximately 2,250 decidedly non-voting felons.84 My
83. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 74, at 189-90.
84. I am grateful to my colleague Steve Bickerstaff for providing me with this
information. Or consider the following:
Twenty years ago, on the verge of becoming a ghost town, Florence, Arizona
began gathering some unlikely-and unwilling-new citizens. Since 1982, the
town has repeatedly expanded its borders to include prisons being built beyond
them, inflating its census count and thereby its state and federal funding....
Today, three fourths of Florence's 21,000 residents are incarcerated, though little
of the money they bring in is spent on them .... [Whiteside includes a box
noting that "since 1995 $5 million has bought everything from a new town hall to
a deluxe senior center, all without a local income tax. Florence's inmates
brought in $4 million last year, more than all local revenues combined."] Such
lucrative opportunities abound nationwide, and competition over them has
inspired at least one fierce legal battle between neighboring towns. Money,
however, isn't the only prize. Although in forty-eight states prisoners cannot
vote, their numbers influence the drawing of congressional and state districts.
And the resulting power shifts can be dramatic, given that most prisoners are
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colleague Steve Bickerstaff, an experienced voting-rights attorney,
informs me that local politicians, when drawing county government
lines, often agree simply to exclude prisoners from the count in order
to provide each county commissioner with a roughly equal number of
voting constituents. The reason, according to Bickerstaff, has almost
nothing to do with abstract political theory; rather, county
commissioners are concerned about equalizing the practical burdens
of their office. Insofar as one of their primary responsibilities is
taking care of local roads, a commissioner with, say, only one hundred
voters who might want to register complaints, is at a significant
advantage over his colleagues who might have to deal with one
thousand angry constituents. There is, then, no apparent sense in
which Texans incarcerated in Hartley County are "represented" in
the local county commission. They are, for purposes of computing
the relevant districts, non-persons, without even the three-fifths status
accorded slaves.
To return once more to the Old South, as is perhaps appropriate
here in Chapel Hill, it was always unfair to the "slavocrats" to treat
them as advocates of counting slaves as only three-fifths of ordinary
human beings. I have no doubt that they would have been utterly
delighted to have each slave count as five ordinary humans, so long as
they could not vote, since any such augmentation would have the
practical result of increasing the slaveowners' power. Indeed, even
the three-fifths rule acted as a considerable augmentation of the
South's political power, enhancing its representation not only in the
House of Representatives but also, and just as importantly, in the
Electoral College. There is good reason, for example, to believe that
Thomas Jefferson would not have prevailed over John Adams in 1800
had he not benefited from the Electoral College "bump" provided by
slaves.85 It was the anti-slavery North that had originally suggested
minorities from urban, Democratic areas and reside in typically white, rural,
Republican enclaves hundreds, even thousands, of miles from home.... A bill
allowing prisoners' home states to claim them was introduced in 1999 by Rep.
Mark Green (R) of Wisconsin-where a house seat was lost following the 2000
Census-but apparently his colleagues preferred the status quo.
Robert Whiteside, Map: Sprawling for Prisoners, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Feb. 2002, at 88.
85. See Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413,442-43 (2001). Finkelman states:
The truth of [Hugh] Williamson's observation about the need of the South to
have its slaves counted in choosing the President becomes clear when we
examine the election of 1800 between John Adams, who never owned a slave,
and Thomas Jefferson who owned about two hundred at the time. The election
was very close, with Jefferson getting seventy-three electoral votes and Adams
sixty-five. Jefferson's strength was in the South, which provided fifty-three of his
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that slaves be treated as non-persons when computing representation,
and, concomitantly, it was they who insisted that slaves count for no
more than three-fifths of a person. One could easily argue that slaves
would have been better off with the North's rule, however much it
formally denied their membership in the polity. And, of course,
slaves would have been even worse off had they been counted as
whole persons!86
So the question very much remains open to us, both as
constitutional lawyers and as practical political theorists, as to who, if
anyone, among the non-voting eligible population should necessarily
be included in population pools that determine the allocation of
representatives. In other words: Who, and for what reasons, among
those not entitled to vote nonetheless deserve to "be represented" in
American political institutions? And, just as much to the point, what
does it mean to "be represented" if one is deprived of the right to
vote?
It should be obvious that denial of the franchise, which allows
one to choose one's leaders, is formally unconnected with a very
different question, which is whether these leaders have any duty,
sounding in political morality, to take the non-voters' interests into
account. Surely no one would (publicly) argue that the fact that
children cannot vote means that elected officials are free, as a matter
of political morality, to disregard their interests. This is true even if
these officials are secure in the belief that by the time those who are
electoral votes. If Jefferson had received no electoral votes based on counting
slaves under the Three-Fifths Clause, John Adams would have won the election.
We cannot know how American History would have played out if Adams had
won re-election in 1800. But the possibilities are intriguing. When we purchased
Louisiana we would have had a President opposed to slavery.... [I]it s at least
worth wondering how different our situation might be if the Constitution had not
used the electoral college, tied as it was to the Three-Fifths Clause, to elect the
President. More importantly, we can only wonder how American history might
have played out if the Founders had developed a method of choosing the
President that was not weighted in favor of slavery.
Id. at 442-43 (citations omitted); see also PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 203 n.65 (2d ed. 2001)
(noting that "Thomas Jefferson's victory in the election of 1800, and Madison's elevation
to the position of secretary of state and heir apparent, would be possible only because of
the electoral votes the southern states gained on account of their slaves." Furthermore,
"without the three-fifths clause John Quincy Adams might have had more electoral votes
than Andrew Jackson and might have been elected outright in 1824.").
86. See also Reader, supra note 46, at 563 ("[I]t cannot seriously be argued that the
interests of slaves would have been better served by being formally recognized as whole
persons, the constitutional rule desired by the South, than by being excluded altogether,
the constitutional rule desired by the North.").
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now children can vote, they will have long since stopped identifying
with tots and will focus on interests more appropriate to having
achieved (at least legal) maturity. And opponents of women's
suffrage never argued that women's interests were not deserving of
representation; indeed, the claim was that their fathers, husbands, and
brothers were motivated by male chivalry to protect adequately any
legitimate interests women might have. Similarly, one might well
argue that elected officials, even if not politically accountable to
prisoners or resident aliens, should, nonetheless, treat them with an
appropriate concern and respect that will assure that their interests
are in fact taken into account in the making of public policy.
All of this might have made a modicum of sense in a world we no
longer inhabit, which included elaborate theories of the male's duty
to protect vulnerable females or the ubiquity of public officials
sufficiently virtuous as to be wholly unmotivated by such crass
interests as paying sufficient attention to the interests of actual voters
as would allow the officials to be returned to office in the next
election. That we do not inhabit such a world does not mean it is
unimaginable. Indeed, it was the world, at least in imagination, of the
Founding Generation, which, with rare exceptions, hated the very
idea of political parties, identified with "faction," and was committed
to a "politics of virtue" that would place public leadership in the
hands of the "best men" of the community who would make
disinterested decisions motivated only by a desire to serve the public
interest.
This vision of politics, of course, did not outlast the election of
1800. The imbroglio attached to naming Thomas Jefferson our third
President generated the 1803 proposal and ratification of the Twelfth
Amendment that, by separating the election of the President and
Vice President, recognized the existence of political parties and the
linkage between candidates and mass publics.87 By the 1820s, the tacit
reliance on "virtual representation" by the virtuous of nonvoting
masses of Americans fell victim to the so-called Jacksonian revolution
(that in fact preceded the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson as
President) that adopted what was at the time viewed as "universal
suffrage" inasmuch as it allowed basically all white men to vote and
therefore to determine for themselves whom they wanted to protect
87. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Ernest Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth
Amendment? 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 930-32 (2002) (recounting a history of the
Amendment).
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their interests. As one of the key slogans of this period put it, "To the
Victor Belongs the Spoils." Losers must wait until the next election.
An obvious reality of a party- (or "faction"-) based view of
politics is that it provides almost no support, either in theory or in
practice, for the image of the benevolent leader who disregards the
views of the electorate-including, most importantly, his or her own
supporters-on behalf of "the public good." For starters, one must
have a theory of what constitutes the "public good." However, most
contemporary political theorists, especially if influenced by
economics, which has long since given up any commitment to notions
of "just price" or distributive justice that differ from market-produced
outcomes, would define it simply as the vector sum produced by
vigorous, partisan political competition. This competition is
structured by the skillful use of political resources, including, of
course, the ability to organize with one another in voting blocs that
can serve to get the attention of relevant politicians by indicating the
price (or the gains) attached to serving these voters' interests. To be
deprived of the right effectively to organize voting pools is the
equivalent of turning up at the local hospital without proof of
insurance. Every now and then someone might take pity on you, but
it is a lousy way to get decent medical care.
In the context of political competition, it is impossible to avoid at
least some reference to gerrymandering. After all, the essence of
gerrymandering is not only to assure the victory of one's political
favorites, but also to provide such victories at the cheapest cost. That
is, one does not want to create a district with 100% Democrats or
Republicans (unless, that is, one is, respectively, Republican or
Democratic and wants to "pack" the district in question with
"wasted" votes). It is this reality that led Sam Issacharoff and Alex
Aleinikoff to the brilliant notion of "filler people," defined as those
members of the disfavored party who are assigned to a given district
simply in order to "fill up" the population pool required to meet post-
Baker "equipopulation" standards but who are otherwise expected to
know (and accept) their assigned place as political losers deprived of
access to the spoils of office.'
Consider in this context the truly remarkable statement found in
Justice White's opinion in Davis v. Bandemer,9 the case in which the
88. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 588, 628-34 (1993).
89. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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Court announced, as a practical matter,9° that it would not intervene
in so-called "political gerrymanders," by which one political party
does whatever it can to maximize its own electoral prospects and, by
definition, minimi e those of its political opponents. I note that
Justice White was writing for himself and Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun; the collective amount of service-and, therefore
experience-as elected political leaders among these four Justices
totaled exactly zero. That did not stop them from confidently
offering their
perception that the power to influence the political process
is not limited to winning elections. An individual or a group
of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually
deemed to be adequately represented by the winning
candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that
candidate as other voters in the district.91
Could any sensible person believe this? Am I simply deluded in
believing, for example, that Texas Senators Phil Gramm and Kay
Bailey Hutchinson are less likely to be influenced by my views than
by those expressed by someone who is, at the very least, a registered
Republican voter? Does anybody believe that Vermont
Representative Bernard Sanders is as attentive to the interests of
Vermont Republicans as he is to his fellow left-wing Democrats? To
be minimally fair to the Justices, they said "adequately represented"
rather than "equally represented," but one still is completely
mystified as to the baseline by which one could measure "adequacy."
The Justices are writing of voters, of course. But why should
their "deeming" be confined to voters? If elected officials are
sufficiently high-minded and imbued with Rawlsian concern and
respect for every member of the electorate regardless of political
identification, why should they be particularly interested in whether
the supplicants who come to their offices or send them beseeching
letters are even voters? What we see in Justice White's pious
reassurance is the traces of a theory of virtual representation, by
which those without an effective vote (or, perhaps any vote at all) are
90. As Sam Issacharoff suggested to me, the term "as a practical matter" is doing a lot
of work, since the formal holding of the case is that gerrymandering is justiciable and,
therefore, that federal courts could conceivably intervene in at least some political
gerrymanders. That is true, of course, but the fact is that such intervention has been
notably absent in the fifteen years since then, not least because the standards for
intervention set out in Davis are formidable. Whatever may be the "law on the books,"
the "law in action" is that partisan gerrymanders, as a practical matter, receive no
meaningful review from courts.
91. Davis, 478 U.S. at 131-32 (emphasis added).
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informed that their interests will be sufficiently protected by the
virtual representative. What makes the representation "virtual," of
course, is precisely that ordinary mechanisms of political
accountability are lacking. Perhaps, in the mischievous analysis that
has become attached to contemporary discussions of redistricting,
92
voting is completely "expressive," serving more as the equivalent of a
gold star by the state signifying that one is a member in good standing
of the polity rather than a practice indeed linked to the nitty-gritty of
politics and the protection of vital interests of those collectivities of
voters we call political parties or, at least, "interest groups."93
"Virtual representation" has obvious affinities to what is sometimes
called a "trusteeship" or "guardian" model of representation.94 In
such models the task of the representative is to "exercise discretion
and cast roll call votes in pursuit of their constituents' best
interests,"95 however these interests might (mistakenly) be conceived
by the constituents themselves. One can, of course, offer a
Madisonian provenance for such a view: "[I]t may well happen that
the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people,
will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the
people themselves" or by representatives who consider themselves
obliged simply to serve as transmitters of their constituents' views.96
Indeed, as Professor Banzhaf pointed out decades ago, almost
immediately after the revolution signaled by Reynolds, if the point of
an electoral system is "simply to select the requisite number of wise
and able men [sic] to act together to make judgments for the people
of the state[, t]here is no evidence to show that the ability to select
such men depends closely on population." 97
Return once more, to convicted felons, who, as we saw earlier,
can be deprived of the suffrage not only while they are "paying their
debt" to society through confinement in prison, but for their entire
lifetimes.98 If we actually support this practice, then we should go on
92. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, passim (1993).
93. See Gerken, supra note 29, at 1425-26, for a useful discussion of the role that
"expressive interests" should play in the analysis of apportionment.
94. See Reader, supra note 46, at 554-55.
95. Ia at 554.
96. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
97. Id. at 555 (quoting John F. Banzhof III, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do
They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L. J. 1309,1325 (1966)).
98. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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to ask (and answer) whether prisoners and/or convicted felons
"deserve" any representation in the political process and, if so, how
we think such representation could possibly take place. As to the first
question perhaps we should return to old practices and view felons as
suffering a "civil death" that makes them effectively non-persons,
politically, even if not, technically speaking, "outlaws" who have no
legal rights that non-felons are bound to respect. One might be less
harsh, at least descriptively, with regard to resident aliens, but still ask
if they are entitled to any political representation at all. Is it
legitimate, for example, for resident aliens to expect elected officials
to pay any attention to their interests, except insofar as assuaging
them might be instrumentally helpful to the officials "real"
constituents, citizens and/or potential voters?
To the extent that we take seriously the civics-book pabulum
articulated in Davis, then we can have our cake and eat it too. That
is, we can, as good liberals, denounce as outrageous the suggestion
that certain persons are disentitled to any representation in our
political institutions while supporting the apparently far less extreme
position that these very same persons are properly estopped from
participating in the electoral process. But, as already suggested, the
more we adopt such an analysis-and the linked Ninth Circuit view
that the key is "equal constituents per voting representative," the
more one has moved very far away from the "naive" meaning of one
person, one vote. It should, under this understanding, be entirely
irrelevant if, say, District A has 5000 voters and District B has only
3,000 voters so long as each has a total population that is roughly
equal to the other. There may be much to be said for this view.
Nevertheless, my point is simply that its defense will require
something other than the ritualistic incantation of our mantra.
If, however, we believe that voting is important for more than
expressive reasons, then it is unclear why we do not recognize that a
"right to effective representation" entails, at the very least, a
presumption of a right to vote that should require a "compelling state
interest" to defeat. Just as importantly, why not recognize the right
not to be subjected to political institutions, including legislative
districts, that are designed precisely in order to deprive the groups
with which one most strongly identifies of a practical ability to gain
political power? One might go further and argue that the
contemporary meaning of Republican Form of Government is that
the general right to vote extends to the right to vote for certain
offices, including electors of the President of the United States. To
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the extent that five Justices, in Bush v. Gore,99 suggested that there
was no such right, that it was a matter of mere legislative grace that
the populace was allowed to participate in presidential elections at all,
I believe they were grievously mistaken. But that is the topic for
another day.
CONCLUSION
Earl Warren apparently considered Reynolds v. Sims'0° (and,
presumably, its progeny) to be his highest achievement on the
Court.01 Part of the reason, I strongly suspect, is that he viewed it as
part-and-parcel of the general attempt by "his" Court to attack some
of the dilemmas posed by America's racial history. Consider the
implications of the fact that both Baker and Reynolds arose from
states of the old Confederacy and that the primary beneficiaries of
the apportionment systems then in use were undoubtedly whites
(since relatively few rural African Americans were, at the time,
allowed to register to vote, a development that awaited the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its aftermath). Thus, Warren
wrote that had regular reapportionment taken place "fifty years ago
we would have saved ourselves acute racial troubles. Many of our
problems would have been solved a long time ago if everyone had the
right to vote and his vote counted the same as everybody else's."1°
Warren may be right that some problems might have been solved
had, in effect, the Fifteenth Amendment not become a dead letter for
almost a century following its formal addition to the Constitution.
And it is certainly possible that the "reapportionment revolution"
sparked by Baker has helped in some measure to alleviate racial
tensions. But, surely, we can today recognize an element of naivet6 in
Warren's comment, as we realize that the forty years since that
decision have scarcely seen the solution to our "racial troubles."
Indeed, as residents of North Carolina have special reason to know,
the tensions produced by so-called "racial gerrymandering" seem to
be an ubiquitous part of our contemporary polity, and nothing the
Supreme Court has done over the past decade has truly changed the
situation.
99. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
100. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
101. See LUCAS. A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 247
(2000).
102. JACK H. POLLOCK, EARL WARREN 209 (1979), quoted in POWE, supra note 101,
at 249.
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Whatever the historical explanation of the Warren Court's
interest in political districting, it enunciated its doctrines in highly
general terms. I hope that I have demonstrated the extent to which
the Supreme Court's venture into legislative districting has failed to
confront adequately the profound questions embedded in the now
almost forty year-old maxim of one person, one vote. It will be
interesting to see whether there will have been any more judicial
wrestling with these questions by the time we celebrate (if that is the
proper word) the fiftieth anniversary of Baker.
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